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20. Aesthetics and Morality in Kant and Confucius:
A Second Step
Christian Helmut Wenzel
In the framework of his transcendental philosophy Kant strictly separates
morality from aesthetics. The pleasure in the good and the pleasure in
the beautiful are two different kinds of pleasure (zwei Arten des Wohlge-
fallens). As a consequence, a moral act as such cannot be beautiful. Only
in a second step does Kant indicate possible connections between mor-
ality and aesthetics in his comments on aesthetic ideas, symbolism, the
sensus communis, and education in general. In Confucius by contrast,
we do not find such a radical separation between beauty and morality.
He talks of humaneness (ren, 仁) and ritual (li, 禮). Projecting Kantian
notions into the Analects, “beauty” seems to slide between the two
and “moral” acts appear to be beautiful. One might wonder whether
Confucius missed a point, or whether Kant overdid the separation.
Or maybe both conceptions, of morality as well as of beauty, cannot
so easily be translated from one philosophical tradition, or mind, to
the other, and there is nothing like ren and li in Kant. In this essay I
ask whether there is an “inner” and an “outer” in Confucius, and I in-
troduce Kant’s notion of “subjective purposiveness” and relate it to the
Confucian notions of dao (道) and tian (天) as well as to ren and li.
Reading the Analects, one easily feels that Confucius trusts in cer-
tain correlations between the inner and the outer, where I think here
of the inner as moral feeling or ren (humaneness, benevolence) and of
the outer as li (ritual).1 We should practice (outer) rituals to acquire
the right (inner, moral) attitudes. One feels this suggestion is based on
the belief that outer performances can make us aware of inner feelings
for human values. Of course, there is no guarantee: “The Master said,
Clever words and a pleasing countenance—little humaneness [ren]
1 My association of the inner with moral feeling or ren is intended to be loose and
preliminary. Differences and similarities should become apparent in the course
of this essay.
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there.”2 Things can go wrong, and we all know that. Confucius certain-
ly did. Nevertheless, some kind of trust in positive correlations can al-
ways be felt throughout the Analects: “The Master said, A human being
who lacks humaneness—what is ritual to someone like that? A human
being who lacks humaneness—what is music to someone like that?”3
Music and ritual must be performed with the right attitude, because
only through such an attitude do they acquire their true meaning and
value. Confucius believes in outer practices leading to the development
of such inner attitudes. The performance of music, archery, and other
forms of ritual will lead one to realize, see, and develop the right
kind of moral views and feelings. For this reason, and with this hope,
Confucius recommends education and learning in general. The outer
is not merely a sign but also a stimulus for development of the inner.
This is what I mean by “trust in positive correlations”.
My talk of the “inner” and the “outer” may seem imported and
projected here. One might think Confucius himself does not speak in
such terms.4 He does not speak of “mental representations” or
“souls”. But he knows of deceit and mere outward appearance; that
is all I need here to feel justified in importing these terms of an inner
and an outer for the moment.5
Comparable, one might think, to the correlation of beautiful ritual
and moral attitude in Confucius, Kant talks of a “beautiful soul” (eine
schçne Seele) (5:300 [§42]) and of “beauty as a symbol of morality”
2 Confucius, The Analects of Confucius, tr. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2007), 1:3.
3 Confucius, 3:3.
4 But see 4:17 (“reflect on your own account”) and 5:27 (“anyone who can …
look inside himself, and put the blame there …”). Confucius does talk about
the inner, in some way. How, and to what degree, has to be worked out.
5 Hence I tend to side with Benjamin Schwarz against Herbert Fingarette. See
Benjamin I. Schwarz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge,
Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1985), 72–4. For a passage point-
ing out sources in Herbert Fingarette, Benjamin Schwartz, Henry Rosemont,
and Chad Hansen, discussing Confucius’ concern (or lack of concern) for peo-
ple’s internal psychological life, see Philip J. Ivanhoe, Ethics in the Confucian Tra-
dition (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), 170,
n.22. Also Tu Wei-Ming, Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian
Thought (Boston: Cheng & Tsui Company, reprinted 1998; Lancaster-Miller
Publishers, 1978) freely talks of an inner and an outer, of ren as an “inner mor-
ality”, a “self-perfecting” and “self-fulfilling process of an individual”, and a
“principle of inwardness”, and of li as its “externalization” (9–13, see also
17–30).
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(5:351 [§59]). Kant even provides a whole theory that allows us to ex-
plain how beauty and morality are linked and why and how this link is
merely an indirect one, thus leaving, and even creating, room to ac-
count for failed correlations. According to Kant, beauty and morality
are based on acts of reflection where we take ourselves as subjects in
general, abstracting from personal considerations. Pleasure in beauty
must be disinterested and felt by us as human beings as such. Only
then are we justified in claiming universal validity for our judgment
of taste. Similarly, the morally good is realized in acts based on univer-
sality considerations regarding rules and principles.6 This similarity, or
isomorphism, between aesthetic and moral acts of reflection can be im-
agined to be underlying some of Confucius’ intuitions. In Analects 3:8,
for example, he writes:
Zixia asked, saying,
Her artful smile engaging,
Lovely eyes in clear outline,
Colors on white ground,
What do these lines mean?
The Master said, The painting comes after the white background.
Zixia said, So ritual comes afterward?
The master said, Shang (Zixia) is the one who reads my meaning. At last I
have someone to discuss the Odes with.
I read this passage as a way of pointing out ren: three items are given and
the fourth, ren, has to be figured out: As the lovely (mei, 美) eyes are re-
lated to the white ground, so is ritual to ren. The latter is in both cases a
prerequisite for the former; a stands to b as does c to x, where x is the
unknown element: a:b = c :x. Without the white background (b), you
cannot draw the eyes in clear outline (a), and without ren (x), ritual
(c) does not make sense. The eyes are beautiful only against the white
background and ritual must be performed with the right attitude. It is
the white background in relation to the colorful and lovely eyes that
should remind the reader of ren as a prerequisite for ritual and its beauty.
The analogy is an aesthetic one. Beauty serves morality by being a visi-
ble symbol for it. This way of putting it fits the Kantian conceptual
framework of beauty being the symbol for morality.
6 See Christian Helmut Wenzel, An Introduction to Kant’s Aesthetics : Core Concepts
and Problems (Malden, Massachusetts and Oxford, England: Blackwell, 2005),
113–9, for an exposition of beauty and morality and their symbolic relationship
according to Kant.
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But Confucius does not talk about “acts of reflection” or a “free play
of our faculties of cognition”. He is not a philosopher like Kant. Why
and how morality is a prerequisite for beauty of ritual, such as archery or
music, remains unclear. Nevertheless, the picture Confucius offers has
its charm (not in Kant’s sense of Reiz, though usually translated as
“charm”; 5:223 [§13]). The eyes, colors, clear outline, and white
ground all belong to the realm of the visual and aesthetic, whereas ritual
and ren belong to the moral realm. But there is no such strict separation
here. Ritual itself is aesthetic, and the white ground is given a moral
tone. Both ritual and ren appear as being beautiful. Kant would, strictly
speaking, resist such a view, or move, and allow for it only in a symbolic
way. Moral feelings cannot be perceived and therefore cannot be beau-
tiful. But, on second thought, maybe ren is not quite the same as moral
feeling.
Another connection between the moral and the aesthetic, if we
continue to allow ourselves to import these terms here, can be seen
in a passage relying on the notion of harmony (he, 和): “The Master
said, What ritual values most is harmony. The Way of the former
kings was truly admirable (mei) in this respect.”7 But what exactly is
meant by “harmony” here? The context talks of loyalty, trustworthi-
ness, and filial behavior as being of primary concern, whereas ritual,
the arts, and government come second.8 I therefore think the harmony
of inner attitudes is meant here and gives the ritual its beauty. Such
beauty has to “shine through”. But how is this supposed to work? Rit-
uals are performed in the form of acts and processes that unfold in time
and space. Seen from the outside, one has to know, or somehow “see”,
that they are not superficial and merely punctually performed but that
they reflect and are the result of the right inner attitude. How does
one “see” such an inner attitude from the outside? Even seen from
the inside, in first-person perspective, when performing rituals oneself,
one is led, as one might be surprised to find out, to the same question:
One often imagines oneself as being seen and regarded by others. One
sees oneself through the imagined eyes of others and thus relies on oth-
ers to see oneself. The inner is accessible in first-person perspective part-
ly through imagining a second- or third-person perspective. Of course
one can go wrong, or even deceive oneself. There is room for vanity.
But that is another question.
7 Confucius, 1:12.
8 See Confucius, 1:2, 1:4, 1:7, 1:11, and 1:13.
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“Zixia asked about filial devotion. The Master said, The difficult
part is the facial expression.”9 Again, Confucius trusts in the correspond-
ence. The harmony that “ritual values most” (quoted above) can there-
fore be understood as the outer appearance of an inner harmony, similar
to the facial expression that should be the outer appearance of the prop-
er inner attitude of filial devotion. Confucius’ trust in education through
ritual is based on such inner-outer correspondences. Another passage
that I read in this way is 4:1: “The Master said: Humaneness is the
beauty of the community.” In opposition to the interpretation suggest-
ed so far, an interpretation that takes harmony and beauty as being based
on inner qualities such as loyalty, trustworthiness, and filial behavior,
one could quote 3:25. There Confucius talks of Wu music as being
“perfect in beauty, but not perfect in goodness” and thereby presuppos-
es the possibility of beauty being separated from inner qualities.10 Appa-
rently something can be beautiful without the right inner qualities shin-
ing through. But I think 1:12 and 4:1 are not meant in this way.11 In
fact, they point out the (ideally) right correspondence between beauty
and goodness and the desirability of that correspondence.
Another example of a link, tacitly assumed between the inner and
the outer, can be found in 6:16: “The Master said, If you have the
good looks (mei) of Song Zhao but lack the eloquence of Invocator
Tuo, you’ll have a hard time escaping blame in the world today.” Con-
fucius lived in difficult times, when having good looks and even being a
good person were often not enough. Although it is not something that
Confucius approves of, he recognizes it as an unfortunate fact that some-
times you have to argue and be eloquent if you want to be successful
and escape blame “in the world today”. The next sentence, 6:17,
makes this clearer: “Who can go out of a house without using the
door? Why does no one use this Way of mine?” Although the right
Way seems so obvious to Confucius, it is not practiced at his time.12
9 Confucius, 2:8.
10 For further comments on 3:25, see Christian Helmut Wenzel, “Beauty in Kant
and Confucius: A First Step”, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 33 ( Jan 2006), 95–
108, here 98–9.
11 For an interpretation of both 1:12 and 4:1, see Wenzel “Beauty in Kant and
Confucius: A First Step”, 99–102.
12 The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Reading, trs. Roger T. Ames and Henry
Rosemont, Jr. (New York: Random House, 1998), refers to the Dingzhou text
and gives another translation of 6:16, preferring “humaneness” to “eloquence”.
But I think we do not need to make such an adjustment. Confucius is not
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How far can we go with our talk of the “inner” in Confucius? How
far are we justified in doing so? And how far can we go with our talk of
“morality” (Moral) and “beauty” (Schçnheit), in Kant’s sense of these
terms, in our interpretation of Confucius? If we say, as I just did, that
a moral attitude—of filial piety, say—has to “shine through” and to
give an act or a ritual performance its “beauty”, Kant would not
agree.13 Firstly, to him, within his transcendental philosophy, only ob-
jects of the outer senses can be called “beautiful”. Secondly, if a per-
formance was beautiful, the grounds for this could not be moral ones,
such as moral attitudes that somehow “shine through”. Beauty, Kant in-
sists, must stand on its own feet. It must have its own specifically aes-
thetic justifying grounds, independently of morality. The “free play”
of imagination and understanding must not rely on moral considera-
tions, not even on similarities to moral reflections. The similarity must
be gratuitous. Only then, Kant thinks, is it the case that beauty can
serve morality. The link between the two is based on an essentially gra-
tuitous isomorphism between reflections underlying judgments of taste
and reflections underlying moral judgments. Aesthetic universality can-
not be reduced to moral universality, in judgment as well as in reflec-
tion. Something cannot be beautiful because it is good, nor can it be
good because it is beautiful.
But maybe we have already made a mistake at the beginning, by
identifying ren with morality (Moral) and the inner, and by identifying
mei with beauty (Schçnheit).14 Firstly, morality is a rather abstract notion
in Kant. It belongs to reason: practical reason (praktische Vernunft). Kant
lived at the time of the Enlightenment that stressed autonomy and ra-
tional abilities, and already in Aristotle we find strong links between
morality and rationality, because theory and theoretic contemplation
happy with his time and does not approve of the situation where one unfortu-
nately often needs eloquence as well. He does not recommend eloquence.
13 For a discussion of the relation between ren and li in general, not necessarily in
relation to beauty, or mei, see Tu Wei-Ming, Humanity and Self-Cultivation, and
Shun Kwong Loi, “Rén 仁 and Lî 禮 in the Analects”, in: Bryan W. Van Nor-
den, Confucius and the Analects: New Essays (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002), 39–52. Tu emphasizes the creative, dynamic tension between
the two. Shun discusses two extreme positions, one seeing li as defining ren
and thereby making the latter depend on the former, the other taking li as
merely instrumental for developing ren and thereby giving ren a more independ-
ent status. Shun himself suggests an intermediate position.
14 On ren, see Confucius 1:3 and 3:8; on mei, see 3:8, 1:12, and 6:16.
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(heyqia) always figure in the background. Both Aristotle and Kant were
interested in the natural sciences. Nothing like this can be found in
Confucius. Secondly, Confucius did not consider problems with the
conceivability of freedom of will versus physical determinism, especially
as we find the latter against the background of Newton’s physics. Con-
fucius therefore did not have to venture toward something like tran-
scendental philosophy in order to cope with the problem of free will.
Thirdly, morality assumes a rather intangible character in Kant, and
one might wonder whether this is so in Confucius as well. According
to Kant, one is never sure whether one has really performed a morally
good act or whether some hidden selfish interest was involved. The
moral person has to be excluded from the deterministic, physical
world. It shrinks to a mere point. Confucius also expresses some kind
of reservation or doubt regarding our knowledge of humaneness
(ren)—he often says things such as: “I don’t know if he is humane”
and “I don’t know how he can be called humane.”15 But he is referring
to the humaneness of others, not his own. Whether he has doubts re-
garding himself, in his own case and in first-person perspective, is anoth-
er question.16
In spite of these fundamental differences and the problems of com-
mensurability they create—and I think they indeed do create such prob-
lems—I nevertheless think it is fruitful to introduce a central notion
from Kant’s third Critique into the Analects : the principle of purposive-
ness (Zweckmßigkeit). The subjective principle of purposiveness is the
most important “moment” of the four moments of the judgment of
taste, and it is supposed to help bridge the gap between nature and mor-
ality in Kant. The principle of purposiveness appears in three “modes”,
as I would like to call it : It appears subjectively in beauty, objectively in our
understanding of organic nature, and transcendentally in the natural scien-
ces. In all three modes we find, to put it very generally, something fit-
ting something else, as if by chance, and without us being able to ac-
count fully for why we find things the way we do. In aesthetics, we
can read such experiences as signs. Kant speaks of “hints” (Winke), tell-
ing us that we fit into nature and that our hopes to realize our moral
ideas in this world are not out of place. This should sound familiar, in
15 Confucius, 5:8 and 5:18.
16 In 7:33, Confucius remarks “The title of sage or humane man—how could I
dare lay claim to such?” But this is less an expression of doubt, and more a
sign of modesty.
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some way, to anyone having read the Analects. What is more, the Kant-
ian principle of purposiveness can be seen as giving support to Confu-
cius’ trust in rituals, as I will explain in the following.
When judging an object to be beautiful, we find it purposive for a
free play between imagination and understanding, a play that is, firstly,
pure (i. e. , free from personal, individual interests), and secondly, har-
monious, as would be required for cognition in general. The play of
the faculties transcends the individual and opens horizons for cognition
and discovery.17 For Kant, even the pleasure it gives rise to is based on
this feature of transcending the individual. This is part of what makes it
an a priori pleasure. We contemplate and feel the pleasure as human be-
ings in general, as human beings qua human beings. The symbolic link
with morality is then based on this feature of generality; for Kant this is
not mere empirical generality but even a priori universality. But there is
more. On an even higher level, we take an “intellectual interest” in
beauty by taking beauty as a hint that tells us that our moral hopes
might not be frustrated.18
Talk of intellectual interest in beauty applies primarily to beauty of
nature and not to beauty of art. But then, as the latter is the product of
genius and genius is a gift of nature, both the hint and the intellectual
interest can be found in beauty of art as well. This is relevant to our dis-
cussion of Confucius, because we can ask how “natural” a ritual possibly
can be. We can mistrust rituals, pointing out that they are artificial cre-
ations of humans and that they can go wrong. This worry, in turn, could
be countered by saying that ritual can be the product of genius, where
genius is, in a Kantian way, inspired by “nature”, or, in a Confucian
way, by Heaven (tien). Nevertheless, we then still have the problem
of determining in particular situations what is, and what is not, an act
or suggestion of genius, or Heaven.
Confucius emphasizes ritual, because he wishes to re-establish order
at a time of war and the disappearance of traditional values. Ritual has a
practical purpose. But it is also harmonious (he) and beautiful (mei). This
harmony is mainly social harmony, but I think it also has a cosmological
17 See Christian Helmut Wenzel, “Beauty, Genius, and Mathematics : Why Did
Kant Change His Mind?”, History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (Oct 2001), and
Wenzel, An Introduction to Kant’s Aesthetics, 133–40, for an account of beauty
and genius in mathematics within the Kantian framework. Even in mathemat-
ics, I think, some kind of freedom matters.
18 For Kant on our “intellectual interest” in beauty, see 5:298 (§42).
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dimension. Although Confucius is mainly aiming at inter-subjective
uniformity between human beings, as well as conformity with the tradi-
tional rules, time and natural circumstances have to be taken into ac-
count as well. In Kant, it appears, prima facie, very differently: the har-
mony in question here, aesthetic harmony, is a harmony between our
cognitive faculties, imagination and understanding. This harmony is in
us, in our ways of perceiving, understanding, conceptualizing, and
forming ideas. In Kant it is an intra-subjective, in Confucius a more
inter-subjective harmony that matters—at least so it might seem so far.
Of the three modes of purposivness (subjective, objective, and tran-
scendental), only the first is linked to beauty. The other two are related
to teleology and the empirical natural sciences. Only the first is helpful
in seeing beauty as a symbol of morality, whereas the other two modes
point toward nature. Nevertheless, the element of chance and gratuity
can be found in all three. We find ourselves fitting into nature on a gra-
tuitous basis, and this again matters for Kant’s concept of beauty.19 How
does Confucius fare in comparison with this?
Compared with he and mei, Confucian tian and dao figure more cos-
mologically. Although dao should be realized and practiced by us, it ex-
ists already in nature outside. Human harmony and beauty are derived
from it. What comes closest to this in Kant might be the principle of
purposiveness. Although this principle is a priori and part of our faculty
of judging, and therefore in us (as is typical for transcendental philoso-
phy), it nevertheless forms a bridge between nature as being given and
nature as being systematically understood. It underlies empirical order
(the second and third modes of purposiveness). Kant’s principle of pur-
posiveness thus offers a possibility for an explanation of the role of tian
and dao in Confucius. It can be seen as giving grounds for trust in rituals.
Of course, again, there is no guarantee. Rituals can go wrong.
The harmony Confucius is aiming at is a harmony of dao, and we
can find this harmony in three ways: (1) between human beings, (2)
in relation to traditional values and rules, and, though possibly to a lesser
extent, (3) with nature as it is given. The first (morality) and the last (na-
ture) can be seen to figure also in Kant’s notion of purposiveness. But
19 I do not know how much Kant would have changed his views had he known
of the evolutionary theories that we know today. He certainly foresaw many of
their features, and it is remarkable that he interpreted the “beauty of nature” as
being based on a “blind” and mechanical, and not a purposefully designed, na-
ture (see the recent work of Alexander Rueger on this matter).
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the second (tradition) we find only in Confucius and not in Kant. Con-
fucius had faith in the past; Kant did not.20 Kant trusts more in reason
and the future, whereas Confucius believes in the ways of the past
and their power to re-introduce dao. Confucius models his ideas on a
concrete, though past, reality. Kant proposes abstract principles for the
future.21 Confucius trusts in ritual and the idea of the gentleman as a
model for emulation. It is therefore not surprising that aesthetics and
ethics are more closely related in his world view than in Kant’s : aesthet-
ics is about what we can see, or otherwise perceive, in the Greek sense
of the word “aesthesis” (aishgsir), and in some sense we can see and
perceive ritual performances and the behavior, manner, conduct, and
comportment of a gentleman. We can see a model such as a gentleman
or a ritual performance in time and space, but we cannot see the cate-
gorical imperative. The latter is abstract and involves reflection about
maxims and their universalizablility. Kant’s interest in mathematical
laws of nature had an effect on his conception of morality, placing
him in a position more distant from that of Confucius. In his aesthetics
20 For a brief presentation of views by Fingarette, Hall and Ames, and Roetz that
do not see Confucius as really turning to the past, see Ivanhoe, Ethics in the Con-
fucian Tradition, 5–10. This would count against the view presented here. Fur-
thermore, Kant also saw values in the traditions from the past. He recommend-
ed setting up standards for poetry in Latin, because this language does not
change any more and therefore provides stability. He also recommended disci-
pline over genius whenever the latter tends to be exaggerated and superficial.
But I think his trust in the progress of the sciences and in the power of reason
and autonomy was stronger than his love for the past, and here I see the differ-
ence between him and Confucius, in whose views we do not find the natural
sciences play such a role and have such a driving force.
21 No wonder Fingarette finds no “crossroads” in Confucius. There is only one
past, whereas there are many possible futures. The past is already there and can-
not be changed, while the future is open (at least so it seems, a determinist
might say). Thus if one is oriented toward the past, there will be no “cross-
roads”, while regarding the future one has to make choices and to set up max-
ims for oneself to act upon. It must be admitted, though, that when looking
into the past for orientation, one often finds more than one instance that one
could take as a model and choose to follow. Thus one still has to reflect and
to make choices. For the “Way without crossroads”, see Herbert Fingarette,
Confucius—The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper & Row Publishers,
1972), ch. 2. To avoid a wrong impression, it must be said that Fingarette
sees Confucius as an innovator and not as turning to the past (ch. 4). He also
thinks we should not look for an “inner” in Confucius (ch. 3). However, as
much as I find his views interesting and thought provoking, I do not follow
him in these two points. Compare note 1, above.
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on the other hand, he took a position different from the rationalist tra-
dition, inviting the idea that his views are closer to Confucius’ in this
domain. Thus aesthetics might appear to be a more suitable domain
of comparison than ethics.22 But then the element of freedom, intro-
duced and insisted on in Kant’s aesthetics, standing as it does in oppo-
sition to the German rationalists’ attempts to introduce objective rules of
taste, must be squared with Confucius’ views of rituals. This is likely not
to be so easy, because with Kant’s emphasis on freedom in his aesthetics,
it is easier for him to move to modern art for instance, than is the case
with Confucius.
Of the three elements of harmony in Confucius, mentioned above,
only (2), the element of beauty through harmony with a past reality and
of following ritual to re-introduce dao in our human activities, is absent
in Kant. Instead, we might say, we find in Kant (2’) the a priori principle
of purposiveness; this is not about the past or about dao, but about na-
ture as given. This principle explains beauty and bridges what appears to
be a gap between morality and nature. Such a gap is absent in Confucius
from the start, because no natural sciences had torn nature and morality
apart. No Newton and no Galileo had created the threat of physical de-
terminism against our feeling of moral freedom and agency. The ab-
sence of this threat for Confucius, and the absence of the views this
threat gave rise to, creates the biggest difference between the two think-
ers’ conceptions of morality. This is why (2) is very different from (2’).
For Kant, there must be two separate worlds, one of moral freedom and
another of physical nature, the noumenal and the phenomenal, to escape
this threat. At least there must be two very different perspectives. Not so
for Confucius. In his view, we find dao penetrating everything, outer
nature as well as humanity in us. The inner therefore has a very different
flavor in Confucius.
Kant and Confucius take it as evident that morality and ren, respec-
tively, are valuable and that one cannot argue for their value. Neverthe-
less, there remain differences between them. Kant gives an explanation
for beauty through his analysis of the judgment of taste, but Confucius
does no such thing. Kant also tries to explain how beauty is linked to
morality, whereas Confucius does not. Confucius simply “relies” on
the link, as we might say when applying Kant’s theory. He recommends
22 For a discussion of Kant’s emphasis on the role of feeling in aesthetics, in op-
position to the rational tradition of his time, see Wenzel, An Introduction to
Kant’s Aesthetics, 4 –7.
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the practice of rituals, not only pragmatically, counting on its order-cre-
ating function, but also aesthetically, relying on the harmony and beauty
this practice creates. His intuitive idea that harmony and beauty “shine
through” can be explained and justified if we have theories of aesthetic
and moral reflection at our disposal as we find them in Kant. A further
aspect of comparison between the two philosophers on the relationship
between morality and aesthetics is that Confucius saw aesthetic qualities
as refinements of moral ones, while Kant’s ideas can be applied, as in
Schiller,23 to develop the concept of an “aesthetic education”. But
this is a topic for a separate essay.
The a priori principle of purposiveness even offers a guarantee of
some sort, not a guarantee for each individual case, but a guarantee in
general, regarding the possibility for such a link between beauty and
morality. For Kant, this was important, because it creates grounds for
our hope for a better future and it involves not only aesthetics and mor-
ality, but also a science-oriented metaphysics. It involves not only sub-
jective and objective, but also transcendental purposiveness. The latter
can be seen only very dimly in Confucius, if at all, because there is
no theory in Confucius comparable to the Kantian transcendental theo-
ry of a priori purposiveness. Again, there simply was no Leibniz or New-
ton in China. Even Aristotle’s notion of heyqia is far away from Con-
fucius’ thoughts. On the other hand, Confucius may not have been a
transcendental realist either. His views of tian and dao, expressed some-
times with hesitation and sometimes with affirmation, can be seen as ex-
pressions of idealist intuitions—I do not mean skeptical intuitions about
the existence of the external world as we find them in Berkeley, but
positive intuitions about human values as we find them in Kant. The
a priori principle of purposiveness can therefore be seen as a principle al-
lowing us to explain the role of tian and dao in such intuitions in Con-
fucius.24
23 Friedich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, tr. Eli-
sabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1982[1967]).
24 I wish to thank my students from National Chi Nan University, Taiwan, for
their questions and discussions during a course I gave on aesthetics in Kant
and Confucius, and I wish to thank Philip J. Ivanhoe, Cheng Chung-Ying, Mi-
haela C. Fistioc, Shun Kwong-Loi, and James Peterman for pleasant conversa-
tions and helpful comments on earlier versions on this essay.
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